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A REVIEW OF A CASE AGAINST BLAISE 
PASCAL AND HIS HEIRS 
David A. Schum* 
THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE. By L. Jonathan Cohen. New 
York and London: Oxford University Press. 1977. Pp. 380. 
$22.00. 
I. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
A recent book by Professor L. Jonathan Cohen of Oxford 
University, The Probable and the Provable, provides new in-
sights into the concept of probability in the intellectual task of 
inductive inference, a species of human reasoning about which 
there is perpetual controversy. The terms inference and proba-
bility recur throughout jurisprudence. The fact finder in crim-
inal or civil proceedings, for example, must often make infer-
ences about the truth of facts when the evidence is incomplete, 
inconclusive, or unreliable. This task, as Wigmore, for one, 
concluded, 1 is usually inductive and can be viewed as using 
observable evidence to draw conclusions about general proposi-
tions or facts. The fact finder, in other words, must weigh 
evidence or balance probabilities. As Maguire et al. remark at 
the very beginning of their casebook on evidence: 
Evidence is produced at a trial so that an impartial trier can 
decide how an event occurred. Time is irreversible, events 
unique, and any reconstruction of the past [is] at best an ap-
proximation. As a result of this lack of certainty about what 
happened, it is inescapable that the trier's conclusions be 
based on probabilities. 2 
Cohen offers a view of inductive inference which is rooted 
in the works of Sir Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill. Cohen's 
view of inductive inference leads to a new conception of proba-
bility, one, he believes, especially congenial to juridical inference. 
In fact, he applies his new probability system, which he terms 
inductive probability (PJ), to the Anglo-American legal system. 
* Professor of Psychology and Mathematical Sciences, Rice University, 
Ph.D. 1964, Ohio State University. Research suworted by National Science 
Foundation Grant SOC 77-28471 to Rice University.-Ed. 
1. J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 20 (3d ed. 1987). 
2. J. MAGUmE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 1 (6th ed.1973). 
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Cohen contrasts his system with what he calls mathematical 
probabilities (PM_). Mathematical probability was initiated by 
the seventeenth-century French mathematician Blaise Pascal in 
his studies of games of chance. Since Pascal's time many indi-
viduals have revised and extended mathematical probability sys-
tems which are highly useful in the study of a wide variety of 
random processes. Although Cohen recognizes the richness of 
mathematical probability systems and. their applicability to 
many scientific areas, he notes their inadequacies for, and ques-
tions their applicability to, juridical inference. 
Cohen frequently refers to PI measures as Baconian proba-
bilities to acknowledge that they are part of the legacy of Ba-
con's seminal work on inferential methods of science. Similarly, 
PM measures are frequently called Pascalian probabilities. As 
the title of this review suggests, I will address Cohen's views 
concerning the inadequacy of Pascalian PM measures and the 
suitability of Baconfan PI measures in applications wi-tiiin 
jurisprudence and related areas. 
The Probable and the Provable assumes a fairly high level of 
knowledge of formal logic and probability theory. However, 
sections of this book which relate to inference in jurisprudence 
can, I believe, be mastered by those who have some aversion to 
or lack of interest in mathematics. In this review I off er two sets 
of comments about Cohen's book, one for those averse to mathe-
matical symbols and one for those without such an aversion. I 
believe Cohen's work is important and will influence future 
studies of juridical inference. Consequently, this book deserves 
a hearing from the largest possible audience. 
II. NONTECHNICAL REVIEW 
It is common to think of probabilities in connection with a 
wide variety of phenomena in law, medicine, science, and busi-
ness. Mathematics has developed a rich system of probabilities 
useful in these areas. Although there has been some disagree-
ment about what probabil-ity statements mean and about how 
numbers called probabilities are determined, there has been 
essential agreement among mathematicians about the basic 
properties of probabilities. Probabilities are ~umbers between 
zero and one. If there are two events that cannot both happen 
at the same time, the probability of one or the other happening 
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is the sum of their separate probabilities. If two events can both 
occur, the probability of their joint occurrence is determined by 
multiplying the probabilities of the separate events. In my in-
troductory comments i' gave the label PM to probabilities which 
have these three properties. These simple algebraic properties 
have formed the basis of a rich and extensive probability system 
which now helps solve many remarkably difficult and subtle 
problems. 
Rich food sometimes causes indigestion, and Cohen argues 
that the richness of the PM system causes intellectual "indi-
gestion" when mathematical probabilities are applied to infer-
ences at trial. The symptoms of such indigestion appear in the 
form of paradoxes: Some of these paradoxes arise because of 
the multiplication rule within the PM system which determines 
the probability of the }oint occurrence of two or more events, 
while others arise because of a special case of the addition rule 
which determines the probability that one of two events has 
happened, if they both cannot have happened. This special 
case is called the negation rule and concerns mutually exclusive 
events like "rain tomorrow" and "no rain tomorrow" · ( which are 
exhaustive, since it will either rain or not rain tomorrow) . The 
event "no rain tomorrow" is the logical complement or the 
negation of the event "rain tomorrow." If I tell you that the 
probability of rain tomorrow is 0.8, I must, within the PM 
system, tell you that no rain tomorrow has probability 0.2. The 
more likely "rain" is, the less likely "no rain" is under the rules 
of the PM system, since probabilities for complementary events 
must total one. 
Cohen argues that the multiplication rule for PM is incon-
sistent with the forensic standards of proof in civil cases and 
with the many interpretations of the legal requirements for 
"inference upon inference." In such inferences, you must, for 
example, prove B from C and then prove A from B. Concerning 
the "preponderance of evidence" or "balance of probability" 
rule in civil cases, Cohen argues that the multiplication rule 
within PM allows a plaintiff to lose his overall case on the bal-
ance of probability even if each element or component of the 
case was won on the balance of probability. That is, the joint or 
overall case consists of element 1 and element 2 and element 3 
and so on. Under the PM system, the probability of the overall 
case (given the evidence before the court) is obtained by mul-
tiplying the probabilities of each of the elements (given evi-
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dence relevant to each element). Even assuming that the 
probability of each element is much greater than 0.5 ( to satisfy 
the preponderance of evidence rule), the product of numbers 
less than one sooner or later drops below 0.5. Thus, the overall 
contention could have probability less than 0.5 even though 
every element in the contention had probability greater than 0.5. 
Moreover, when you multiply 0.8 times 0.4 you get the same 
result as when you multiply 0.4 times 0.8; the order in which 
multiplication is performed makes no difference. This causes 
difficulties in relating PM to the frequent requirement that in 
"inference upon inference" in civil cases where B is proved from 
C and then A is proved from B, A can be proved from B "on 
balance of probabilities" but B must be proved from C "beyond 
a reasonable doubt." Thus, the A, B "link" in the chain of in-
ference can be weak provided that the B, C "link" is very strong. 
Because order of multiplication is irrelevant, the PM system 
will give the same result if the A, Blink were strong and the B, 
C link were weak. 
Other difficulties arise, says Cohen, because the negation 
rule requires that probabilities for complementary events must 
equal one within the PM system. Cohen argues that this require-
ment makes a trialappear to be the division among the litigants 
of a fixed amount of case weight; the more plaintiff receives the 
less defendant receives. He believes this is unfortunate since the 
str.ength of the plaintiff's arguments may not necessarily . de-
tract from the strength of the defendant's arguments. In short, 
he views a trial as a test of case strength and believes that the 
PM system encourages the view that one litigant's gain is the 
other's loss. Finally, Cohen tells us of other assorted difficulties 
of applying PM to "prior presumption of innocence" and "be-
yond a reasonable doubt"- prescr1ptions in criminal cases and to 
more specific problems concerning corroborative and convergent 
evidence. 
A major portion of The Probable and the Provable is devoted 
to developing a new system of probabilities Cohen calls "induc-
tive probabilities" and which I symbolize PI. Cohen's essential 
claim is that his new system more adequately reflects the way 
ordinary persons actually reason inductively. Inductive proba-
bilities, although they rest upon developments no less carefully 
reasoned than mathematical probabilities, have simpler, more 
primitive, properties. In fact, they do not behave at all like PM 
measures: they cannot be added, subtracted, multiplied, or di-
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vided. Although evidence can change the probability of an event, 
we cannot say, for example, that event A is twice as likely as 
event B, given relevant evidence. In fact, we can only make what 
are called ordinal or ordering relations among inductive proba-
bilities. I can say that, on the evidence, A is more probable than 
B, but I can neither say how much more probable nor how many 
times more probable. 
The PJ system lacks the richness of PM. What do we receive 
in return? Cohen argues that various prescriptions and stan-
dards in the Anglo-American legal system are not meant to sat-
isfy mathematicians or philosophers; they are meant to guide the 
reasoning of ordinary citizens when they serve as factfinders. 
He further argues that the basic underpinnings of his PJ system 
better reflect the ordinary inductive reasoning individuals use 
in their day-to-day affairs. One of his claims is that the results 
of psychological experiments involving probability estimations 
are better explained in terms of the PJ system rather than the 
PM system. In addition, he shows how the various paradoxes 
mentioned above are not encountered in the PJ system. Unlike 
the PM system, for example, the PJ system allows a plaintiff 
to win a civil suit if and only if each element in the suit is estab-
lished on the balance of probability. Moreover, in civil suits in-
volving "inference upon inference," the Pr system is not in-
sensitive to the ordering of strength among links in the inferen-
tial chain and in any litigation the Pr system captures the trial 
as a test of strength rather than as a division of case merit. 
If you read further, you will see that I do not agree with all 
of Cohen's conclusions. The elegant simplicity of Pr, however, 
illuminates a variety of evidentiary and other inferential is-
sues about which there is unending controversy. I feel safe in 
predicting that The Probable and the Provable will be an influ-
ential work in future studies of juridical and other inferences. 
III. TECHNICAL REVIEW 
For those of you remaining with me I will now be a bit more 
specific in telling you about what I believe are the important 
aspects of Cohen's work. 
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A. Mathematical Probabilities: A Legacy from Pascal 
Let us begin by taking a brief look at certain developments 
and interpretations of PM in order to identify those features of 
PM that, according to Cohen, cause difficulties when it is 
applied in various contexts, including juridical inference. In 
games of chance the determination of probabilities is an exercise 
in counting. In such games there is usually some "visible· sym-
metry" of the underlying process which reinforces the assump-
tion of equally likely outcomes; fair dice, well-balanced roulette 
wheels, and well-shuffled cards are examples of random proces-
ses which have this property of visible symmetry. Sometimes 
the assumption of equally likely outcomes is called the indiff er-
ence principle; if a die is fair you should be indifferent about 
the likeliness of its six possible outcomes when the die is thrown. 
In such cases the probability of event E is determined by count-
ing the number of outcomes favorable to the occurrence of E 
and dividing this number by the total number of outcomes possi-
ble. Probabilities so determined are sometimes called classical 
probabilities; rules for their determination date from the time of 
Pascal. Such determination is not possible when there is not a 
finite number of possible outcomes or when there is no reason to 
assume equally likely outcomes. 
The so-called relative frequency interpretation of probability 
extends PM to make it applicable to random processes in which 
the outcomes are not necessarily equally probable and not neces-
sarily finite in number. In such cases the probability of an event 
is estimated empirically. Assuming a random process which is 
repetitive or _replicable, the probability of an event E is esti-
mated by determining the frequency of outcomes favoring this 
event in a randomly chosen sample of n outcomes. The probabil-
ity of E is estimated by the ratio of the number of outcomes fa-
voring E to the total number n of outcomes in the sample. The 
limit of this relative frequency in a long run of randomly 
chosen samples is taken to represent the probability of E. 
A relative-frequency interpretation of PM does rather well 
as long as we wish to apply probability to processes which are 
repetitive in nature. Many random processes in various areas of 
science are repetitive in nature and so a relative frequency in-
terpretation of probability is congenial to these areas. However, 
we often wish to express our uncertainty about .the occurrence 
of an event which either has happened or will happen exactly 
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qnce. In many legal, medical, business, and military affairs it is 
necessary to evaluate the likeliness of events in nonrepetitive 
or nonfrequentistic processes; the events of concern are unique 
or one of a kind. The probability that your horse wins tomor-
row's race is a one-of-a-kind event since this race and its outcome 
will happen exactly once. The event that defendant X was seen 
running from the house where the crime was committed is a 
unique event. Now, you will have no trouble in finding someone 
who will express probabilities about various outcomes of tomor-
row's race. Neither will you have difficulty finding a treatise on 
evidence law which talks about probabilities in connection with 
evidence that involves patently unique events ap.d nonrepetitive 
outcomes. Under another interpretation of PM you a1:~ free, 
subject to certain rules for coherency, to assign numbers called 
subjective or personal probabilities which indicate the strength 
of your belief that some repetitive or nonrepetitive event in 
question has occurred or will occur. Adherents of this interpre-
tation argue that your subjective probability of an event can be 
supported by whatever information you have. 
Other interpretations of PM are possible, including a causal 
or propensity interpretation in which PM grades the measur-
able physical connection between objects or processes. Perhaps 
the most complete summary of various interpretations of P:i\f 
is to be found in a recent treatise by Fine. 8 Cohen has performed 
a valuable_ service by showing how various probability state-
ments are, in fact, evaluations of inferential soundness and he 
off~rs a useful categorization scheme for J?M based upon various 
criteria for establishing inferential proof. 
Following are seven properties of PM ; the first three are 
basic or axiomatic. For each property we shall consider both un-
conditional or monadic probabilities of the form PM (E), where 
E is some event of interest, and conditional or dyadic probabili-
ties of the form PM: (EIF), which is read "probability of event E 
given that or on the premise that event F occurred." By defi-
nition PM (EIF) = PM.(E n F) /PM (F), provided that PM 
{F) =/= 0. The conjunction or intersection symbol n is read 
"and." The terms monadic and dyadic are Cohen's terms; for 
reasons discussed in his second chapter he objects to the term 
"conditional probability." 
8. T. FINE, THEORIES OF PROBABILITY (1973). 
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(i) For any event E, PM (E) ;:::: 0; for any events E and F 
where PM (F) ~ 0, PM (EIF) ~ 0. 
(ii) Let S be the "sure" event; one that is certain to occur. 
Then, PM (S) = 1, and for any E where PM (E) '¥= 0, 
PM(SIE) =1. 
(iii) Suppose events E and F are mutually exclusive, then 
PM (E U F) = PM (E) + PM (F). Assuming 
PM (G) ~ O,PM (EU FIG) = PM (E!G) + 
P.M (FIG). This is the so-called additivity property. 
[The union or disjunction symbol U is read "or."] 
(iv) Let Ecbe the complement of event E (i:e., E = "not 
E"). Since E U Ec =Sand E and Ec are mutually 
exclusive, PM (E) + PM (E ) = 1. Assuming 
PM (F) =j= 0, PM (EIF) + PM (_ECIF) =1. This is· 
the negation rule. 
(v) For any two events E and F, PM (E n F) = 
PM (E)· PM (FIE) where PM (E) # 0. If PM (G) 
;;-= o, PM CE nFIG> = PM (EIG> · PM (FIE Ii G). 
This is the conjunction or product rule. 
(vi) Suppose event E fails to condition or change opinion 
about the likeliness of F; i.e. PM (FIE) = PM (F) .· 
In this case, events E and F are said to be independent 
and PM (E n F) = PM (E) · PM (F). Suppose 
PM (FIE n G) = PM (FIG) ; this asserts that events 
E and F are independent conditional upon the occur-
rence of G. In this case the product rule for condition-
ally independent events is PM (En F!G)=PM (EIG)· 
PM (FIG), provided PM (G) # 0. 
(vii) Let H1 and H2 be mutually exclusive events where 
PM (H1) =;6 0, PM (H2) ::;,= O. For any event E 
where PM (E) ¥= 0, PM (E jiH2) = O, and 
PM (H2 IE)=/= 0, 
PM (H1IE) PM (H1) PM (EIH1) Th .. th 
__ _;;c._=---X----. ISIS e 
PM (H2IE) PM (H2) PM (EIH2) 
"odds-likelihood ratio" form of Bayes' s rule, a derived 
property of conditional or dyadic probabilities. The 
left-hand term represents the posterior odds of H 1 to 
H2 given E. The first term on the right is called the 
prior odds of H 1 to H2 . The second term on the right 
is called the likelihood ratio of event E. 
Properties (iv) through (vii) represent a small sample from 
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the very rich collection or syntax of properties derived from the 
three basic axioms. As we shall see, Cohen argues that the nega-
tion and conjunction properties which are basic to PM give rise 
to disturbing paradoxes when PM is applied in jurisprudence. 
He further argues that these paradoxes are not evident under 
his inductive interpretation of probabilities. 
It is easily shown that classical and relative frequency inter-
pretations of PM are consistent with the properties listed above. 
In fact, the basic axioms of PM were motivated by the methods 
used to determine classical probabilities. Are subjective or per-
sonal probabilities consistent with the axioms and other proper-
ties listed above? Of course it depends on whose. subjective prob-
abilities we are discussing. Consider the event E that the 
Yankees will repeat as World Champions in the 1979 season. 
You have your view of the likeliness of this event and I have 
mine. Subjectivists argue that, though we may reasonably dis-
agree about PM (E), our probabilities ought to be coherent 
within the three basic axioms mentioned above or else some un-
pleasant things can happen. If I say, for example, that PM (E) 
= 0.2 and that PM (Ec) = 0.6 ( in violation of the negation 
property) I can-be exploited as a "money pump." This means 
that certain wagers can be constructed in which I am guaranteed 
to lose no matter what happens. Thus, subjectivists usually con-
fine discussion to individuals who are "coherent" with the basic 
axiom system of PM . Whether or not persons, left to their own 
devices, are thus coherent is an interesting empirical issue, one 
generating a substantial amount of research in experimental 
psychology during the past two decades. 
There are many methods for eliciting subjective probabilities 
from individuals. Some involve indirect methods in which sub-
jective probabilities are inferred from a person's choices among 
wagers. Other methods are direct and involve overt elicitation of 
probabilities, odds, and likelihood ratios. As you might expect, 
coherency with PM axioms is sometimes observed and sometimes 
not. Cohen argues that the actual responses of subjects in some 
of the research in this area are coherent within P1 but not 
within PM. In short, he argues that P1 is much better than PM 
in describing the way in which people actually assess the likeli-
ness of events in their everyday lives. He also tells us that it is 
no accident that legal prescriptions regarding probability seem 
to favor a P1 interpretation since these prescriptions have in 
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mind the ordinary citizen who must apply his own reasoning 
processes and accumulated experience in evaluating evidence. 
I have one final point about PM and the properties listed 
above. When one adds probabilities such as in Property (iii) or 
takes ratios of probabilities such as in Property (vii) , there are 
implicit assumptions about the scale properties of PM. In all 
PM systems that I am aware of, PM (E) is a number in the 
closed interval [0,1]. Adding probabilities assumes equal units 
of probability and dividing probabilities assumes equal units 
plus a true or nonarbitrary zero point. Though PM always 
has a lower limit of zero in every system I am aware of, includ-
ing Pi, there is plenty of room for argument about what zero 
probability means, as the author discusses. It-is plausible to 
think that PM is an equal interval scale for classical and rela-
tive .frequency versions of PM, but what about ·subjective ver-
sions?"Is the change in your subjective likeliness of from 0.67 to 
0.68 equivalent to the change of from 0.43 to 0.44? This is a 
serious issue for me since most of my rebuttal arguments 
against some of Cohen's conclusions involve .subjective judg-
ments of ratios. I will return to this issue in a later section of 
this paper. 
B. Inductive Probabilities: A Legacy from Bacon and Mill 
At the basis of Cohen's system of inductive probability is his 
belief that probability is a measur·e of inferential soundness or 
provability. Because there are different kinds of proof rules, 
there are different kinds of probability. Thus, if we say that the 
probability of E on the premise F indicates the degree of infer-
ential soundness of a rule for inferring E from F we shall have 
to accept di.fferent interpretations of this probability since there 
are various ways in which such proof can be established. I have 
already mentioned the author's categorization of PM measures 
based upon various proof criteria. Thus, the author emphasizes 
from the very outset of his work that his system of PI measures 
is not intended to replace other conceptions of probability. What 
he does argue is that there is a particular proof criterion which, 
if considered, leads one to a new system for grading the inf eren-
tial soundness of inf erring E from F and, thus, grading the 
probability of E given knowledge that F occurred. This new 
system of inductive probabilities does not conform to the calculus 
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of PM. Though there are a few points of contact between Pi and 
PM, PI is not derivable from PM nor is it in any sense a special 
case of PM, 
A brief comment about notation is necessary before I pro-
ceed. In discussing PM I have used notation that is common in 
many treatises in which PM measures occur. The monadic or 
unconditional probability of E was indicated by PM (E); the 
conditional or dyadic probability of E on premise F was indicat-
ed by PM {EIF). ~hen I discuss Cohen's p·I measures I will 
use his notation scheme to help prevent the reader from being 
confused about which system is being discussed. In the P1 sys-
tem, the monadic probability of E is represented by P1 { E) and 
the dyadic probability of E on the premise F is represented by 
PI {E,F). 
A neglected criterion of proof, according to Cohen, concerns 
a property he calls "completeness." A deductive system is said 
to be complete if statement E is provable from the axioms of the 
system if and only if Ec is ·not provable. Applied to PM we can 
consider the provability o:fi E from Fas a limiting case of PM 
where PM {EIF) · ~ t. T~e PM system is consistent with this 
property of compl~teness since, by the negation rule, PM (EIF) 
= 1 if and only if PM (Ec IF) =0; that is, E is provable from F 
if and only if Ec is not provable from F. 
In an incomplete deductive system there is at least one well-
formed statement E such that neither E nor Ec is provable. In 
such a system we allow for cases in which both the probability 
of E on premise F and the probability of Ec on premise F are 
zero. This obviously rules out PM as a measure of provability in 
an incomplete system since PM (EIF) = 0 and PM (ECIF) = 0 
is incoherent with the PM axioms. One question is: Why should 
we have to consider an incomplete system? Suppose, as the au-
tho:L" argues, we construe the "weight" of relevant evidence to 
mean the amount of relevant evidence as Keynes4 and others 
have done. Keynes proposed that argument E has more weight 
than argument Ec if E is based upon a greater amount of rele-
vant evidence; i.e., E has greater probability than Ec if the 
evidence on balance favors E. The gradation of provability or 
the probability of E, given evidence F, depends just on the 
amount of evidence. Within the PI system, if the amount of 
4. J. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 71-78 (1921). 
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evidence F on balance favors E, P1 (E,F) > 0. If F provides an 
increment of inferability to E it provides none to Ec and so Pr 
(Ec,F) = 0. From the point of view that weight of evidence 
means amount of evidence, F cannot support E and Ee at the 
same time. Here we have a crucial distinction between PM and 
Pr. In the P1 system if·Pr (E,F) > 0 then P1(Ec,F) = 0; the 
negation principle for Pr is not complementary as it is in 
PM . In fact, -in a PM system, as PM (EI F) increases, 
PM (EC IF) decreases since PM (EjF) + PM (EC jF) = 1. 
We must also notice that the converse of the Pr statement "if 
Pr (E,F) > 0 then P1 (Ec,F) = 0" is not true. Evidence F may 
be completely indecisive or irrelevant on E and on Ec and so both 
PM (E,F) and PM (Ec,F) may be zero. Thus if we say that Ec 
is not pr9vable from F we cannot necessarily say that E is 
provable from F since it may be the case that neither E nor Ec 
is provable from F. The author further argues that in many 
everyday matters we must reason inductively from incomplete 
evidence and what we need is a measure of how extensive is the 
completeness or coverage of relevant issues by the evidence we 
have. 
As we shall see, the Pr measure has scale properties that 
differ from those of PM. In fact P1 has only rank-ordering or 
ordinal properties. In this system we can only say that Pr (Ei, 
F1) is greater than, less than, or equal to Pr ( E2,F2) : We 
cannot say how much greater or how many times greater is Pr 
(E1,F1) than PI (E2,F2). This rules out any kind· of additivity 
and it rules out the formation of ratios of probability measures. 
As we observed, the additivity of PM requires an equal unit, and, 
ratios of PM require equal units and a true or nonarbitrary 
zero point. Thus, as far as scale properties are concerned, PI 
is a more primitive measurement system than is PM. As we 
have seen, Pr has neither of the two main properties of PM ; 
Pr is neither additive nor complementational. Professor Cohen 
does not view with alarm the fact that Pr measures are more 
primitive than PM measures. In fact he believes that the or-
dinal characteristics of Pr better account for human inferential 
behavior and for the manner in which various legal prescriptions 
are written. 
The next questions to be asked are (a) How does one de-
termine the gradation of provability or inductive support of-
fered by evidence F to proposition E? and (b) How does this 
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gradation of support influence the probability of E on the prem-
ise F? The author devotes six chapters (chapters 12-17) to 
these matters. The foundation of PJ rests upon certain develop-
ments within inductive logic concerning the concept of inductive 
support. Let us first see how PJ forms part of the intellectual 
legacy from Bacon and Mill. It was Sir Francis Bacon who, in 
his treatise Novum Organum (1620), first attempted to formu-
late and justify inductive procedures for natural science. 0 He 
argued that a proposition or generalization could not be valida-
ted simply by enumerating evidential instances favoring the 
proposition but it could be invalidated by a single unfavorable 
instance. He thus proposed a method of induction by elimination. 
Some hypothesized cause must be co-present, co-absent, or co-
variant to some degree with corresponding effects. Inductive 
inference, according to Bacon, proceeds by using presence, ab-
sence, or degrees of covariation of effects in order to eliminate 
various hypotheses about causes until perhaps only one hypothe-
sized cause is left; the one that survives this process of elimina-
tion can be accepted as the valid cause. This procedure, of course, 
reminds one of a canon for reasoning much favored by another 
sage, Sherlock Holmes, who is reported to have said: 
It is one of the elementary principles of practical reasoning 
that when the impossible has been eliminated the residuum, 
however improbable, must contain the truth. 0 
John Stuart Mill proposed a collection of specific methods 
for induction in his treatise System of Logic. Most present-
day students of experimental design in various areas of 
behavioral, biological, and physical sciences study extensions 
of Mill's, methods without being aware of it. Mill is frequently 
not given appropriate credit for systematizing the design of 
empirical research. A variety of procedures exist for in-
troducing various experimental "controls" so that one can 
isolate valid causes by removing the confounding effects of 
other possible alternative causes. Cohen tells us that the process 
of grading inductive support that one proposition can give 
another has a close affinity to three of Mill's methods for in-
duction. The method of agreement establishes the co-presence of 
a cause and effect; the method of difference establishes the co-
absence of a cause and effect; and the method of concomitant 
5. W. KNEALE, PROBABILITY AND INDUCTION 48 (1949). 
6. A. DOYLE, THE ANNOTATED SHERLOCK HOLMES 17 (W. Baring-Gould ed. 
1967). 
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variation establishes the covariation of a cause and effect. 
Suppose a situation in which we entertain a particular hy-
pothesis H j which explains a characteristic of some phenomenon 
of interest; how do we obtain inductive support for H j? There 
may, of course, be other plausible hypotheses or explanations. 
Imagine now a series of tests which can discriminate among 
alternative hypotheses. Each test involv~s some relevant vari-
able which can be manipulated independently of all others. The 
complexity of the test sequence increases as we proceed because 
at each stage a new relevant variable is added to those already 
present. As the test sequence proceeds.some hypotheses are falsi-
fied by test results and are eliminated from consideration. Sup-
pose Hj survives the process of elimination. The degree or grade 
of support given by the test sequence to H j depends upon the 
complexity level of the test that H j attains. At some point we 
run out of relevant variables to manipulate or we run out of 
time or money and so we stop testing; the surviving hypothesis 
or hypotheses win the day in this process of eliminative induc-
tion. Mill's methods for induction provide the essential logic for 
the design of the test sequence. 
Formally, Cohen identifies a support function, s (H, E), which 
is read "The support for H, given test result E." Suppose there 
are n test levels 1, 2, 3, ... , i, ... , n which represent increas-
ingly complex tests. If H resists falsification or elimination up to 
test level i we can say that the grade of inductive support for H, 
given test result E, is s (H, E) = i/n. Test result E gives the ith 
grade of support where n is the highest grade possible. The sup-
port function value s ( H, E) = i/n says that H has support up to 
level i and no higher; i.e., H was falsified at level i + 1. Sup-
pose the test sequence is replicable; if you object to the test re-
sult the person performing the test sequence says "do it your-
self." Suppose you do and achieve the same result. Replicability, 
in short, provides a measure of confidence in the test result. A 
test sequence replicated enough times becomes, as the author 
says, a "solid evidential fact." Thus, if s (H, E) ~ i/n on the 
basis of replicable or "solid" evidence we are entitled to conclude 
that s(H) ~ i/n; i.e., we can talk about the support for H 
without having to qualify it with a particular test result. Sup-
pose s(Hj,E) = O; Hj is falsified by the simplest test. Hy-
pothesis H k, however, passes test i but is falsified by test i + 1; 
s ( H k, E) remains at level i/n and does not drop to zero because 
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H k obviously has more support than Hj which had none at all. 
It is always possible, and the author cites examples of when 
it has happened, that a theory or proposition H may be true but 
fail to explain certain effects. Anomalies do occur and any 
theory of induction must be able to handle them. It would seem 
foolish to suppose that no theory could remain acceptable when 
confronted with counterevidence. Perhaps, with some slight mod-
ification, theory H can be rescued and resist being falsified at 
some level; one can buy support for H by revising it. 
So far we have an inductive support function s ( H, E) which 
maps ordered pairs of propositions H, E into n + 1 fractions 
from Oto n/n, wheres (H; E) = 0 means that His falsified by 
the simplest possible test ands (H, E) = n/n means that His 
not falsified or eliminated throughout the entire test sequence 
and has the highest level of support. The value of n may not be 
specifiable in any practical application. Technically, this pre-
sents no problem since it is apparent that the support function 
assigns values with only ordinal properties since there is no 
apparent equal unit of "test level difficulty" specifiable. Thus 
s(H, E) only ranks evidential support; the numbers thus ob-
tained are not additive nor can they be used to form ratios. 
The support function s(H, E) has a number of properties, 
two of which are of special interest in view of the author's con-
cerns about PM measures. 
(i) Negation. For any Hand E, where E concerns a phys-
ically possible event or conjunction of events, if s (H, E) > 
0/n thens (He, E) = 0. 
This property may seem inconsistent with what was said earlier 
about the support given H when there is counterevidence at level 
i + 1; i.e., s(H, E) stays at level i/n and does not drop to zero. 
The negation rule asserts that E cannot favor H and Hc at the 
same time; if it favors H then s(Hc, E) = 0. Observe that H 
and He are contradictory statements; if a test sequence which E 
reports appears to favor both sides of a contradiction the test 
sequence itself must be inconsistent and requires adjustment. 
(ii) Conjunction. Suppose H1 and H2 are two proposi-
tions and E is some report of a physically possible test se-
quence. If s(H1, E) ;;;:: s (H2, E), then s(H1 n H2, E) = 
s (H2, E). 
The conjunction principle asserts that the support given by E 
to the joint statement Hi n H2is the same as that given to the 
less-well-supported of the two propositions or to their common 
support level if they are equal. 
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The remaining question concerns how inductive support and 
inductive probability are related. The author tells us that Pr 
(R, E) stands in relation to s(R, E) as deducibility stands in 
relation to logical truth. The inductive probability that a partic-
ular thing is R, on the premise that it is ~, is equivalent to the 
inductive support for the generalization that anything if it is R 
is also E. The corresponding symbolic assertion is that Pr (Raj, 
Eaj) = i/n if and only if s (Raj - Eaj) = i/n. The symbols 
like Haj are read "particular aj is an R"; the arrow means 
"logically implies." The more support you have for a generaliza-
tion involving Hand Ethe higher is-the-probability of R given 
a particular instance of E. The author cautions us that the evi-
dential processes leading to an assessment of P1 (R, E) _are not 
necessarily the same as those leading to s CH, E) . The establish-
ment of s(H, E) rests upon suitably varied experimental or 
observational conditions which are replicable. The establishment 
of P1 (R, E), however, rests upon satisfying ourselves that E 
favors or supports H iJ1 the particular circumstances which E 
and R describe. 
Inductive probabilities have a number of basic and derived 
properties which are summarized in a syntax in chapter 17. 
Following are properties of special interest. 
For Monadic Probabilities: 
(i) P1 (R) ~ 0. 
(ii) If PJ (R) > 0, then PJ (He) = 0. 
(iii) If PJ (H 1 ) ~ PJ (H2), then 
(Negation) 
PJ (H1 n H2) = PJ (H2 )._ (Conjunction) 
(iv) PJ (H1 U H2) ~ PJ (H1 ). (Disjunction) 
(v) P1(H1) ~P1(H2) orP1(H1) ~P1(H2)· 
(vi) If Pr (H1) ~ PJ (H2), and PJ (H2) ~ PJ (H3 ), 
then PJ (HJ)~ Pr (H3 ). 
For Dyadic P1·obabilities : 
(i) Pr (H, E) = PJ (He, EC). ( Contraposition) 
(ii) If Pr(H, E) > 0 and PJ (Ee)= O, then 
PJ (Hf E) = 0. (Negation) 
(iii) If Pr (H1, E) ~ Pr(H2, E), then P1(H1n H2, E) 
= PJ (H2, E). (Conjunction) 
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(Disjunction) 
(v) Pr(H1,E1) ~Pr(H2,E2) orPr(H2,E2) 
~ Pr (H 1' E1 ) . 
(vi) If Pr (H1, E1 ~ Pr (H2, E2) and Pr (H2, E2) 
~ Pr (H3, E3), then Pr(H1, E1) ~ Pr(H3, E3 ). 
Like PM , P1 has far too many derived properties to be 
easily summarized. Following are some facts about P1 which 
are important in relating P1 to inferential issues in jurispru-
dence and other related areas. 
(1) According to Cohen the monadic or prior inductive 
probability Pr (H) tells us something about the strength of 
nature's potential for bringing H about and it has a completely 
different interpretation from PM (H). The essential point is 
that Pr (H) = 0 means simply that there are no prior reasons 
for believing H and not that there are prior reasons for believ-
ing HC. For PM, however, PM (H) = 0 if and only if 
PM (HC ) = 1 which indicates, according to the author, that 
there are prior reasons for believing HC . The monadic negation 
principle asserts that if Pr (H) > 0, ·then Pr (HC) = 0. For 
Pr, if the weight (amount) of your prior reasons supports Hit 
cannot, at the same time, support HC. 
(2) Properties (iii) and (iv) for monadic and dyadic in-
ductive probabilities concern conjunction (intersection) and dis-
junction (inclusive union). These properties for P1 may be 
compared with their counterparts in PM by considering the 
following inequalities. For monadic probabilit1es, where H 1 and 
H2 are any two events: PM CH1 n H2) ·:s:;; PM (H{) 
:s:;; PM (H1 U H2) ~ PM (Hi) ·+·PM lH2·)~Jior dyacfic 
probabilities, where H1, H2, and .E are any three events with 
P(E) ~ 0: PJY.I (H1 n H2 IE) :s:;; FM (H1 IE) ~ PM 
(H1 U H2 IE) :s:;; PM (H1 IE) + PM (H2 IE). 
( 3) The reader familiar with measurement theory will have 
observed that properties (v) and (vi) for both monadic and dy-
adic Pr concern weak-ordering. These properties are similar to 
the connectedness and transitivity axioms of subjective value 
theory.7 Subjective value is an ordinal measure of the worth or 
value of an outcome in a decision task. 
(4) Property (i) for dyadic Pr is interesting. It says that 
7. R. KEENEY & H. RAIFFA, DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES: PREFER• 
ENCES AND VALUE TRADEOFFS (1976). 
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dyadic PI is invariant under contraposition of its arguments 
(Hand E). This is not a ch~i-_a~teristic of PM since PM (HIE) 
need not egEaJ_RM (~CJ.EC ) . _ · 
( 5) One of the most interesting and surprising properties of 
PI is the mann~r in which the inductive probability of H changes 
in response to favorable and unfavorable evidence. Consider 
H and He , supposing a priori that the weight of our prior rea-
sons for believing H is no heavier than the weight of those fa-
voring He. Then, PI (H) = P1 (He) -·--o~ Remember that, 
within the PI system:''weight" means "amount." Now suppose 
we have ~videnceE1· which supports H; then PI (H, E1) 
equals, say, 1/~j_by the_ negatio~-principle P1 (He ,E) = 0. 
Next, E2 is presented which is unfavorable to H. This makes P1 
(He, E1 O E2) = 2/n while, surprisingly, PI (H, E1 n E2) 
= O; again this is what we require by the negation rule. Evi-
dence E 3 arrives which "counteracts" or explains away E2 and 
H is resuscitated since PI (H, E1 ·n E2 n E3 ) = 3/n while 
PI (He , E1 n E2 n E3 ) = 0 as· required. Thus there is a 
marked asymmetry in the effect upon H that favorable and un-
favorable evidence produce. Each item of uncounteracted favor-
able evidence increases the inductive probability of H one grade 
higher. However, an uncounteracted piece of evidence immedi-
ately reduces the inductive probability of H to zero. If this seems 
violently .counterintuitive to you, the reason perhaps is that you 
are retaining PM in your head while reading about PI . Zero 
probability in the PI system means something entirely different 
than it does in the PM system. In the PM system PM (H) = 0 
or PM (HIE) = 0 make H "legally dead" or beyond resuscita-
tion even by evidence overwhelmingly supportive of H. Recall 
that, within PM , PM (H) = 0 if and only if PM (HC) = 1, and 
PM (HIE) = 0 if and only If PM (HC IE) = 1. A zero proba-
bility for Hin the P1 system simply indicates that an inference 
to H cannot be made with any degree of support; it does not 
mean that an inference to Hc can be made with complete sup-
port. 
C. The Case Against Pascal and His Heirs 
If a formal or mathematical system is used to study how 
some task ought to be performed it is said to be used norma-
tively. Normative statements prescribe formally ideal behavior 
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or behavior that is consistent with the basic axioms of the sys-
tem. A formal system can also be used in efforts to study how 
some task is actually performed; in such cases the system is 
used descriptively. The author's essential claim is that signifi-
cant difficulties arise when existing standards for forensic 
proof as well as certain other evidentiary issues in the Anglo-
American legal system are construed in terms of the PM sys-
tem. 8 Thus, his major arguments against PM concern how well 
PM describes these actual standards and prescriptions in the 
law as -it is written. He goes one step further by claiming that 
PM is similarly deficient in describing human behavior in cer-
tain probability estimation tasks studied by experimental psy-
chologists. He then proceeds to show why he believes that the P1 
system better describes probabilistic aspects of our legal system 
and better accounts for actual human behavior in some of the 
experimental studies of probability estimation. Summarized be-
low are six specific difficulties or paradoxes the author says we 
encounter when existing legal prescriptions are construed in 
terms of PM . He believes that these difficulties, though not 
completely insurmountable for PM , are handled more easily 
and naturally within PI . 
1. Conjunction Rule Difficulties in Civil Suits 
Consider a civil suit in which plaintiff's contention H con-
sists of a number of points or elements H1, H2, ... , Hn; i.e., 
H = (H1 n H2 n ... n Hn). Defendant's contention is Hc 
= (H1 n H2 n ... n Hn )C = (Hf u H2c u .. u 
Hn c). In a civil suit plaintiff must prove each element of his 
case on the balance of or on the preponderance of probabilities. 
Letting E represent relevant evidence in the case, this require-
ment asserts that, within the PM system, PM (Hi IE) > PM 
(HiclE), for every Hi, Since PM (HilE) + PM (HiclE) = 
1.0, PM (HilE) must be greater than 0.5. In addition, for the 
overall contention to be proved on the balance of probabilities we 
must have just a very few elements in the contention un-
less PM (Hi IE) is very large for all elements Hi, The reason 
is that the conjunction rule for PM is multiplicative. If the Hi 
n 
are independent conditional on E, then PM (HIE) = i rr 1 PM 
(Hi IE). If you multiply enough probabilities together (even 
large ones), sooner or later their product is less than 0.5. This 
same result will occur even if the Hi are conditionally noninde-
8. L. J. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 58 (1977). 
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pendent given E. Thus, a plaintiff in a complex civil suit involv-
ing many elements risks losing under a PM interpretation even 
if he wins each element on the balance of probahllities. A con-
straint on complexity (number of elements in contention) is un-
known in law and the author, therefore, concludes that the use of 
PM 'is paradoxical in such cases. 
The matter is resolved, says the author, when we construe 
complex civil suits in terms of PI. Suppose Pr (Hk,E) is the 
smallest value among the n values for plaintiff's case. By the 
conjunction rule for PI : 
P1 (H1 n H2 n ... n Hn, E) = P1 (Hk,E). 
Suppose further that Pi (Hi,E) > Pr (Hi c, E) for every ele-
ment Hi ; i.e., plaintiff wins every point of his contention. The 
author says the jury can then infer that: 
PI (H1 n H2 n ... n Rn, E) > Pr (H1C n H2c n ... 
nHnc,E). 
Now, the negation rule for PI asserts that, if Pr (H, E) > 0 
and J;>r (EC) = 0, then Pr (He, E) = 0 and, therefore, 
Pr (H, E) > Pr (HC, E). Thus, the inductive probability of 
plaintiff's entire contention is guaranteed to exceed that of de-
fendant's contention if plaintiff wins each point on the balance 
of probabilities. Notice that there is no constraint on the num-: 
ber of elements in plaintiff's contention.9 
Suppose, however, that plaintiff loses just one of his points; 
for element Hj, PI (Hf i E) > PJ _(!~), E). The conjunction 
rule then will assert that, for plaintiff s case, Pr ( H, E) = 
Pr (Hj, E). A further property of Pr (not included in the sum-
mary above) 1s called the consequence property. It asserts in 
this case that Pr (HC, E) ;;;::: ~I (Hjc, D). Thus, we have 
Pr (HC·, E) ;;;::: PJ (Hjc, E) > Pr (Hj, E) = PJ (H, E). So 
plaintiff loses his overall contention on the balance of pro~abil-
ities. In summary, in the Pr interpretation of the case, plaintiff 
wins the overall contention if and only if he proves all elements 
on the balance of probability. 
2. Inference upon Inference 
Considering civil cases again, the author believes PM to 
9. Id. at 58-59. 
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cause difficulties in cases involving "inference upon inference." 
Wigmore, 10 ref erring to inference upon inference, believed that 
what he called "catenations" of circumstantial and testimonial 
evidence were common in most juridical inferences; for ex-
ample, we seek to prove E from F and then prove H from E. 
Recent work11 on the subject refers to this inference upon infer-
ence as "cascaded" or "multistage" inference. The author dis-
cusses how courts in civil cases normally require each level or 
catenation, prior to the final level, to rest upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, in the above example we must prove E 
from F beyond a reasonable doubt in order to prove H from F 
on the balance of probabilities. In one possible formulation of 
this problem in terms of PM the author shows how inferences 
about H on the balance of probabilities could arise when 
PM (EIF) is relatively small, surely not large enough in any 
case to satisfy the reasonable doubt requirement. His claim is 
that the multiplicative nature of the conjunction rule for PM 
causes the difficulty. Because the operation of multiplication is 
commutative, large PM (EIF) times small PM (HIEOF) yields 
the same result as small PM (EIF) times large PM (HIE n F). 
Such "transitivity" is not altogether expected; the author claims 
that proof should depend upon what is probably inferable from 
known facts rather than upon what is certainly inferable from 
probable facts. 
When we considered PM conjunction-rule difficulties in-
volving component issues in civil cases, we saw how PM ap-
peared quite severe in its effects upon proof on the balance of 
probabilities. For inference upon inference in civil cases PM 
now seems liberal when evalp.ated against existing legal stan-
dards. The author argues that in the PJ system, establishing E 
on the premise F beyond a reasonable doubt establishes E as a 
known fact which provides a firm foundation for establishing H 
on the balance of probabilities. He further shows how the transi-
tivity of proof mentioned above for PM does not occur when the 
problem is construed in terms of PJ . 
10. J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 13. 
11. Schum, Current Developments in Research on Cascaded Inference Pro-
cesses, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN DECISION AND.CHOICE BEHAVIOR (T. Wallsten 
ed. 1979). 
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3. Negation 
Again consider a civil suit in which plaintiff's overall con-
tention H survives on the balance of probabilities; suppose 
PM (HIE) = 0.501 and PM (HCIE) = 0.499. Cohen argues that 
the defendant in this case is entitled· to conclude that the legal 
system has given itself a fairly wide margin for error. It has 
recognized, in effect, that there is a substantial likeliness that a 
losing case deserved to succeed; this, of course, is cold comfort 
to the losing defendant in our example. The fact that the nega-
tion rule for PM is also complementational says that there is .a 
determined amount of "case weight," and that this fixed amount 
of weight is allocated to plaintiff and def end ant. The more one 
side gets the less the other side gets. One may well question why 
it should be true that increased support for plaintiff's contention 
means decreased support for defendant's contention. 
The author argues that this PM conception of balance of 
probabilities in civil case determination is not what is intended 
by our legal system. He says that civil litigation is a trial of 
case strength rather than_ a division of case merit and he be-
lieves that the Pr system reflects this interpretation. We recall 
that in the Pr system the negation rule is not complementa-
tional. In the case mentioned above, if we suppose that Pr (EC) 
= 0, then Pr (H,E) > 0 implies that Pr (RC, E) = 0. Also recall 
that in the PI system "weight" of evidence refers to amount of 
evidence or the completeness of the coverage of relevant points. 
If we say that the evidence on balance favors plaintiff, 
PJ (H,· E) > 0. Since it cannot at the same time favor defen-
dant, Pr (RC, E) = 0. Since plaintiff must win on every point 
of a contention, Pr ( H, E) will increase as more relevant points 
are considered provided that plaintiff's position is upheld on 
each point. · 
4. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Now consider a criminal case in which H is the event that 
defendant is guilty of the charge. Letting E represent the evi-
dence before the court, how large should PM (HIE) be in order 
to exceed the reasonable doubt standard? Suppose PM (HIE) is 
less than 1.0 by some small amount. On evidence E you conclude 
that H falls short of certainty by an acceptable amount and so. 
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you conclude that H is established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The author tells us that an interpretation of the reasonable 
doubt standard in terms of PM is not appropriate. He argues 
that reasonable doubt exists when there is at least one specific 
reason for doubt and not simply that H falls short of certainty. 
Within his P1 system what is necessary to satisfy the reasonable 
doubt standard is a list of all relevant points that have to be 
established (e.g., motive, means, opportunity, etc.) and satisfac-
tion that the prosecution's case against defendant satisfies all of 
these points. Maximal P1 ( H, E) is achieved on the basis of your 
conception of the completeness of the coverage of evidence E on 
relevant matters. Beyond a reasonable doubt is achieved if you 
can think of no other specific reason for aoubting the defendant's 
guilt. 
5. Criterion Difficulties 
Since, as we saw earlier, there are different possible inter-
pretations of PM , we have sooner or later to ask which one is 
appropriate for application to juridical issues. The author rules 
out classical probability for obvious reasons and rules out rela-
tive frequency for the reason that events in juridical mat-
ters are usually unique. Wager odds are ruled out for the 
reason that such odds involve nonprobabilistic issues such 
as the amount of money at stake. Finally, the author rules 
out a conception of PM in terms of the "confirmation function," 
as proposed by Carnap,1 2 on the grounds that there is an infinity 
of such functions and the choice among them is arbitrary. He 
argues that advocates of PM must be able to supply a concep-
tion of PM that fills the gap. He tells us that P1 does supply a 
conception of probability that is a natural representation of the 
manner in which most of us reason inductively in our everyday 
affairs. Since legal standards of proof and other prescriptions 
are meant for jurors who, it is assumed, will apply their ordi-
nary reasoning ability to evidence at trial, the author concludes 
that PI is a better description of what is meant by probability 
in existing legal standards and prescriptions. 
12. R. CARNAP, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY (1950). 
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6. Difficulties Concerning Corroboration and Convergence 
Corroborative testimonial evidence and converging circum-
stantial evidence· are frequently encountered evidentiary pat-
terns in juridical and other inferences. Testimonial corrobora-
tion occurs when two or more witnesses testify to the occurrence 
of the same event. Two or more items of circumstantial evidence 
are said to converge if, independently, they favor the same con-
clusion. Under suitably articulated conditions a i'.!onjunction of 
corroborative or a conjunction of convergent evidence raises the 
probability of conclusion H by an amount greater than that 
provided by any single item in the conjunction. The author pre-
sents several attempts to formalize these evidentiary patterns 
within the PM system. He discusses an early attempt by Boole13 
and a more recent attempt by Ekelof ;14 in addition the author 
provides a formalization of his own using PM . The difficulty 
with any PM analysis, according to the author, is that such 
analyses 'require the incorporation of prior probabilities of con-
clusions. He objects to any representation for the probative force 
of evidence which involves incorporation of prior probabilities of 
conclusions. Among the difficulties he cites of incorporating 
prior mathematical probabilities are: 
(i) In civil cases if PM {H) is sufficiently strong, plaintiff 
could establish an overall case on the balance of probabilities 
even if one or more components of the contention are not estab-
lished. . 
(ii) In the Anglo-American legal system, the accused is 
judged only upon evidence before the court; the accused does 
not come into court having a certain prior probability of guilt. 
(iii) Within the PM system, if the prior presumption of 
innocence is taken to mean very small prior probability of 
guilt, how this probability is to be determined is unclear. 
According to Cohen, when corroboration and convergence 
are construed in terms of PI they simply become different ways 
in which the inductive probability of conclusion H is increased by 
circumstances which are inductively relevant. The added ad-
vantage, he says, is that the inductivist analysis requires no 
13. ·Boole, On the Application of the Theory of Probabilities to the Ques-
tion of the Combination of Testimonies or Judgments, 21 TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH 597 (1857). 
14. Ekelof, Free Evaluation of Evidence, in 8 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN 
LAW 1964, at 45 (F. Schmidt ed.). 
470 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:446 
assumption that the prior probability of any conclusion H be 
greater than zero. We may have Pr ( H) = 0; then, evidence E 1 
is presented which favors Hand so Pr (H, E 1) > 0. If Pr (E1 C) 
= 0, then Pr (HC, E1) = 0. Corroborative or convergent evi-
dence E 2 is then provided for which Pr ( H, E 2 ) > 0 ; this al-
lows one to deduce that Pr (H, E1 il E2) > Pr (H, E 1). Suit-
able independence conditions involving E1 and E 2 can be articu-
lated within the Pr system. 
Two research topics of substantial current interest in experi-
mental psychology concern subjective probability estimation and 
the revision of such estimations in light of additional evidence. 
A frequently employed research method is to present individuals 
with the necessary probabilistic ingredients of some problem and 
ask these persons to combine the ingredients in order to estimate 
the probability of some event specified in the problem. Following 
this, these subjective estimates are compared with corresponding 
calculations based upon formally coherent combinations of the 
problem ingredients. Of course, most of these calculations have 
been based upon the calculus of PM. For example, individuals 
may be supplied with a set of priors PM (Hi) and likelihoods 
PM (EIHi) for i = 1, 2, ... , n and asked to estimate 
PM (Hi ·IE) when Eis known to have occurred. Their estimates 
are then compared with PM (Hi IE) calculated using Bayes's 
rule. 
No one ever expects estimates of probability to be exactly 
equal to corresponding calculations based upon some formally 
· coherent algorithm. Deviations occur, of course, but they are 
usually systematic. For example, under some conditions poste-
rior probability estimates made by experimental subjects are 
typically more extreme than corresponding calculations pre-
scribed by Bayes's rule. Under other conditions such estimates 
are typically conservative with respect to calculations using 
Bayes's rule. Another research method has involved inferring 
an individual's subjective probability for certain events based 
upon the person's stated preferences among alternative gambles 
based upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the events. A not 
unusual finding is that inferred subjective probabilities some-
times do not satisfy the complementation-negation rule for PM. 
The author has taken results from a series of experiments 
performed by Kahneman and Tverskyrn involving various prob-
15. Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHO• 
LOGICAL REV. 237 (1973). 
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ability estimation tasks. These researchers have, for a number of 
years, been interested in determining heuristic rules which in-
dividuals appear to use in estimating probabilities. These heuris-
tic rules individuals appear to use are inferred from compari-
sons between probability estimates and PM calculations. The 
author strongly objects to the statement in some of these studies 
that individuals are "incoherent" or are committing "fallacies" 
when their estimates do not agree with those prescribed by PM. 
He proceeds to show how some of Kahneman and Tversky's re-
sults seem to be explainable under the assumption that subjects 
think according to Pr rather than according to PM. This, he 
says, provides further argument in favor of his PI system when 
applied to jurisprudence since legal prescriptions and standards 
involving probability are written so that they will relate to com-
mon or ordinary conceptions of probability. Such conceptions, 
the author believes, are inductive and not mathematical. 
D. Rebuttal Arguments in Defense of Pascal and His Heirs 
Before I proceed with arguments in defense of PM applied 
to inferences at trial I must now tell you that I am a defendant 
in the case Cohen presents against PM in such applications; in 
addition, I am not an attorJley. I am told that the name given 
nonattorney defendants who plead their own cases is "guilty." 
This acknowledged, I will begin by telling you of the surprise I 
felt, upon reading the introduction of Cohen's work, to discover 
the level of his discontent concerning PM applied in jurispru-
dence. The reason is that for the past few years I have been 
studying what the PM system says are the necessary ingredi-
ents of various cascaded inference tasks. As I proceeded from 
simple to more complex cases I discovered a substantial level of 
agreement between the formalizations I was studying and cor-
responding prescriptions in the rules of evidence and in other 
related treatises. I was further encouraged by discoveri:qg that 
several evidence scholars having the background in law I .do 
not have were arriving at similar conclusions about the efficacy 
of the essential approach I was taking. 
These remarks do not form a preface to a violent attack upon 
Cohen's case against PM. In fact, I agree with many of the 
concerns he exhibits about PM when applied to court trials. 
Available juridical treatises contain an incredibly vast array of 
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inferential issues, more than enough to occupy the attentions of 
inference scholars over several lifetimes. It is obvious to me that 
Cohen and I have focused our attentions upon different aspects 
of juridical inference. We have examined different treatises or 
different parts of the same treatise and each of us has found a 
measure of support for his position. My belief is that no single 
· formal system, including PM or PI , will form an adequate 
representation of every juridical inference task or will account 
for all of the assorted prescriptions made regarding inductive 
inference in our Anglo-American legal system. Following is a 
brief summary of the evidentiary issues I have examined which 
increased my confidence in the descriptive power of PM applied 
in jurisprudence and which led to my initial surprise upon :read-
ing the early stages of Cohen's book. 
Several years ago I became interested in what the PM sys-
tem says are the necessary ingredients of the task of determin-
ing the inferential value of testimonial evidence from witnesses 
whose credibility is less than perfect.10 Our formalizations 
showed, predictably, that the inferential value of such testimony 
depends upon the probative value of the event being reported 
and the credibility of the source. But these formalizations said 
much more. They prescribed the exact nature of the interaction 
between the rareness of an event and the credibility of the wit-
ness reporting this event in determining the prob·ative value of 
the testimony from this witness. Such interaction was suspected 
but not successfully represented in the formalizations of La 
Place, Keynes, and others interested in juridical applications of 
PM .17 Studying testimony from several witnesses, where such 
testimony is either corroborative or contradictory, our resulting 
formalizations show why the aggregate credibility rather than 
the number of witnesses is important in determining the proba-
tive value of such evidence.18 This corresponds with a legal pre-
16. Schum & Du Charme, Comments on tke Relationship Between tko Im-
pact and tke Reliability of Evidence, 6 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN 
PERFORMANCE 111 (1971). 
17. J. KEYNES, supra note 4; P. LA PLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON 
PROBABILITIES (Dover ed. 1951). 
18. Schum & Kelly, A Problem in Cascaded Inference: Determining tho 
Inferential Impact of Confirming and Conflicting Reports from Several Unre-
liable Sources, 10 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 404-28 
(1978). 
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cription mentioned by Cleary19 and by Wigmore. 20 We also dis-
covered that our formalizations for the probative value of testi-
monial evidence included ingredients necessary for incorpora-
ting the major legal grounds for impeaching the credibility of a 
witness and that our formal process was adequate in accounting 
for what the rules of evidence say are the essential components 
of hearsay evidence. 21 
Another formal investigation concerned what has been 
termed the process of "connecting up" the evidence or evaluating 
a current item in light of previously given items.22 Resulting 
formalizations show that the process of evaluating a current 
item of evidence against a background of prior evidence is akin 
to color, brightness, and other contrast processes in sensory 
perception.23 In making a connection between inductive infer-
ence and sensory processes, we noted that it was Hume who said: 
All probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation ... 
when I give the preference to one set of arguments over 
another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning 
the superiority of their influence.24 · 
These formalizations for the process of connecting up evidence 
also show conditions, such as those the courts recognize, under 
which an item of evidence having no probative value on its own 
is, nevertheless, deemed relevant because it conditions· opinion 
about other evidence which is relevant. In very recent i.nvestiga-
tions we have examined various additional evidence subtleties 
such as the locus and extent of redundancy in cumulative and 
corroborative evidence,25 and the joint role of bias-related and 
observational sensitivity-related factors which determine the 
credibility of a witness and, ultimately, the probative value of 
19. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (2d ed.). 
20. J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 318. 
21. Schum, On the Behavioral Richness of Cascaded Inference Models: 
Examples in Jurisprudence, in COGNITIVE THEORY 149 (N. Castellan ed.). 
22. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 143-44 
(1977). 
23. Schum, Contrast Effects in Inference: On the Conditioning of Current 
Evidence by Prior Evidence, 18 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PER-
FORMANCE 217 (1977). 
24. D. HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, Book I, Part III, Section VIII 
(1881). 
25. D. Schum, On Factors Which Influence the Redundancy of Cumulative 
and Corroborative Evidence (Dept. of Psychology, Rice University, Report No. 
79-02). 
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what the witness reports. 26 In none of these investigations could 
we discover corresponding juridical prescriptions to which our 
formalizations seemed uncongenial. 
As I read further in Cohen's book I was very impressed by 
the elegant way in which he develops the essentials of his PI 
system. I was also troubled by the paradoxes he mentions con-
cerning application of PM in jurisprudence. I have no argu-
ment against the legitimacy of PI as an appropriate index of 
uncertainty in inductive inference tasks. The author correctly 
points out that some over-zealous mathematicists frequently re-
fer to PM as "the" formal system of probability. PM is, in 
fact, just one conceptual model for the articulation and manip-
ulation of measures of uncertainty. Following are some general 
concerns I have about the author's work as it is presented in The 
Probable and the Provable. 
1. On the "Weight" of Evidence 
My first concern has to do with the concept of relevancy and 
the establishment of the probative weight of evidence. In chap-
ter 10 on the topic of corroboration and convergence, the author 
argues against any measure of the probative weight of an item 
of evidence in terms of the difference between the posterior 
probability of a conclusion, given this item, and the prior proba-
bility of the conclusion. However, Federal Rule of Evidence 401 
defines relevant evidence as follows: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 27 
This definition seems to specify a prior-posterior comparison of 
the exact sort the author rejects. Within PM it seems natural 
to construe the probative weight of evidence in terms of likeli-
hood ratio, which is one appropriate and desirable measure of 
the change from prior to posterior opinion about the likeliness of 
a fact-in-issue. In discussing the properties of PM I listed 
26. D. Schum, Sorting out the Effects of Witness Sensitivity and Response 
Criterion Placement Upon the Inferential Value of Testimonial Evidence 
(Dept. of Psychology, Rice University, Report No. 79-01). 
27. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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Bayes's rule as Property (vii) . From this property it is easily 
seen that the likelihood ratio for evidence Eis equivalent to the 
ratio between posterior odds and prior odds of H to HC ; thus it 
measures the change in your opinion about the relative likeliness 
of H to Hc , giv.en E. I am not alone in this interpretation of 
rule 401. Others'with the background in law I lack have reached 
the same conclusion.28 
The prior probability of any His, of course, always relative 
to the evidence you have. Let F = (E1 U E2 U ... U En} 
represent the first n items of evidence you receive; then, 
PM (HIF) represents your prior probability of H before you 
receive the next item En+l . The likelihood ratio for En+l is 
PM (En+1IH ) PM(H IF n En+1)/PM(H IF} 
PM (En+l IHC) = PM (HCIF n En+l} PM (HCIF}; 
this measures the change in relative likeliness of H to HC from 
prior to p~sterior upon knowledge of En+l. Since rule 401 says 
nothing about how much evidence has been presented, it ap-
parently recognizes that you will have some opinion about the 
likeliness of H before any evidence is presented at trial. In this 
case, let PM (H} represent your initial prior probability of H. 
Then, PM (HIE1) represents the posterior probability of H 
after the first item of evidence. If this were not the case, we 
could never establish the relevancy of the first item of evidence, 
thus, never get the trial started. Both the PM and P1 systems 
have unconditional, prior, or monadic probabilities; that is, they 
both acknowledge that your opinion about the likeliness of H has 
to have some initial state if we can say it has been revised on 
the basis of evidence. Neither PM or Pr assume that you begin 
an inference task with a mental tabula rasa. The essential dif-
ference between PM and PI concerns how these and other 
probabilities are interpreted and how they can be manipulated. 
As mentioned earlier, the author says that Pr (H} represents 
"nature's potential for bringing about H." Presumably then, Pr 
(H, E} represents nature's potential for bringing about H, on 
the premise that E occurred. The difficulty is that, since PI 
measures are ordinal in nature, Pr (H} and P1(H, E} can never 
28. Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Fact-Finding Process, 20 STAN. L. 
REV. 1065 (1968) ; Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977). 
See also R. LEMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, supra note 22, at 148. 
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be algebraically compared in attempts to measure the change 
from prior to posterior likeliness of H as a result of E. However, 
within the PI system, we can say that there is more evidence for 
H or that there is greater evidential coverage for H now that you 
know E. Thus it appears that prior-posterior comparisons are 
natural within both PI and PM and both appear consistent with 
rule 401. I will again discuss PM measures of probative value 
when I consider the specific paradoxes the author has mentioned. 
2. Difficulties in Posing Inferential Problems 
In discussing the paradoxes of PM and in making other 
comparisons between PI and PM the author cites various PM 
formalizations which he then proceeds to criticize in various 
ways; in one or two cases he derives these PM formalizations 
himself. In several cases, notably concerning examples of inf er-
ence upon inference and corroborative and convergent evidence, I 
believe the presented formalizations do not contain all necessary 
probabilistic ingredients. Part of the problem is that the pre-
sented formalizations involving testimonial evidence require but 
do not contain distinctions of the following sort. Let E = the 
event that the traffic light at the scene of the accident was on 
green, and let Ei = the event that witness W i testifies that the 
traffic light at the scene of the accident was on green. The events 
E and Erare not equivl;!lent events since, of course, we may have 
Ej when Eis true or Ej when Ec is true. As a juror confronted 
with testimonial evidence, your conclusion about H is conditioned 
by Ej and not by E. A vague definition of a conditioning event 
such as F = "the event that the witness testified correctly" can 
contain no useful probative information since F does not tell us 
to what event the testimony refers. Such information is crucial 
in establishing the credibility-related ingredients of the formali-
zation for the probative weight of testimonial evidence. In one 
case involving corroborative and convergent evidence a formali-
zation was cited which was formally incoherent within the PM 
system.29 
In any formal system it is altogether crucial that problems 
be posed adequately. In the case of inductive inference problems 
29. L. J. COHEN, supra note 8, at 99-100. 
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this involves careful determination of what constitutes the ap-
propriate conditioning event (it is not always obvious) and it 
involves articulation of appropriate conditional independence 
considerations. None of the PM formalizations discussed by the 
author involve likelihood ratios. Certain features of the P M 
system are not evident unless formalizations involving proba-
tive weight are expressed in this fashion. In short, I believe the 
PM system can be shown to much better advantage than it is in 
Cohen's work. 
3. Subjective Probability: The Case of the Missing Criterion 
In discussing various interpretations of PM at the beginning 
of his book, the author mentions the subjective or personal inter-
pretation of probability. Later, in discussing the "paradox" in-
volving a choice of PM interpretation for juridical application, 
he avoids mention of personal or subjective probability as one 
possible choice. We recall that he does rule out classical, rela-
tive frequency, and confirmation-function interpretations. Since 
the author does not mention the subjective interpretation, pre-
sumably he does not rule it out. On the other hand, he may 
simply be treating the subjective interpretation with disdain. 
After all, in his early discussion of the subjective interpretation 
of probability he says that "few researchers in the natural or 
social sciences have in fact adopted this personalistic ap-
proach."30 
My view on these matters is somewhat different; within PM 
I believe that the only extant interpretation which does merit 
serious consideration in juridical inference is the personalistic 
or subjective approach in which, subject to some coherence con-
straints, a subjective probability measures your strength of 
belief in the occurrence of some event. Other individuals within 
jurisprudence apparently share this view as well. Wigmore,31 
for one, defines a measure of proof to be "the degree of strength 
of belief of a fact-in-issue produced by evidence on the mind of 
the jury." It is interesting to note that contemporary scholars 
in probability theory define a subjective or personal probability 
30. Id. at 27. 
31. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,§ 2498a (3d ed.). 
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in Wigmore's terms. DeFinetti32 defines a personal probability 
to be "a measure of the degree of belief of a given subject in the 
occurrence of an event." Cohen might be tempted to argue that 
Wigmore's definition in fact corresponds to his conception of 
probability as a degree of provability. This would be fine and, 
if so, I would then see little difference between PI and the sub-
jective interpretation of PM except in matters of scale proper-
ties. Finally, I cannot agree that the subjective interpretation of 
probability appeals to few researchers in the natural and social 
sciences. I find it hard to believe that the author is innocent of 
the prevalence of the subjective interpretation of probability 
in decision-theoretic areas of economics, business, medicine, and 
psychology. In these and other areas many researchers would 
pref er to use Bayesian statistical methods for analysis and in-
terpretation of data but do not because they also wish to have 
their papers accepted by journal editors who, all too frequently, 
adhere to classical statistical approaches based upon a relative-
frequency interpretation of probability and reject other ap-
proaches, not always for informed reasons. 
Uncertainty about fact-in-issue H need not be expressed in 
terms of probability. For example, posterior odds PM (HIE) / 
PM (HC IE) expresses the likeliness of H relative to the likeli-. 
ness orHc, on the premise that E occurred; likelihood ratio 
PJv.l (EjH) / PM ~Ejlfc) · expresses the likeliness of evidence E 
under H relative to the likeliness of E under HC. The author 
correctly rejects wager or betting odds as a representation for 
PM in juridical applications since wager odds (such as those 
supplied by your bookmaker) depend upon other factors such 
as the size of the stakes involved and the number of wagers 
placed. However, wager odds and either posterior or prior odds 
are not the same. It is easily shown that they are mathematically 
equivalent only for fair bets. Thus, posterior or prior odds can 
be expressions of uncertainty and nothing else. Expressions of 
uncertainty in odds and likelihood ratios have the advantage that 
they are not bounded above as is the probability measure. I 
quickly note, however, that this change of scale does not remove 
the necessity for adherence to the PM axioms as far as the 
ingredients of these ratios are concerned. 
In much research on human inference behavior as well as in 
a variety of applied tasks, individuals express relative uncer-
32. B. DEFINETTI, PROBABILITY, INDUCTION, AND STATISTICS 781 (1972). 
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tainty in terms of odds and likelihood ratios. 33 There is an im-
portant issue here. The PI system credits individuals with being 
able to make only weak order judgments regarding uncertainty 
(i.e., "greater than," "less than," or "equal to" judgments). 
The subjective interpretation of probability allows you to credit 
individuals with being able to make ratio judgments of uncer-
tainty. Is this confidence justified? As I mentioned earlier, 
forming ratios on some scale assumes a zero point and a unit on 
the scale; do subjective scales have such properties? We are here 
confronted by one of the oldest and most perplexing problems in 
all of psychology. Do the subjective continua of brightness, loud-
ness, heaviness, or indeed likeliness, have equal units up and 
down their scales? Perhaps no one will ever know; at least there 
is no obvious methodology for making such a determination. 
However, one thing clear is that individuals in a variety of 
behavioral tasks make ratio judgments naturally and coher-
ently; there are several methods for evaluating the internal co-
herency of such judgments. 34 There is, in fact, good reason for 
confidence in human ability to make ratio judgments. The neces-
sity for preserving ratios of stimulus magnitude is readily ap-
parent and is verified by an assortment of commonly observed 
perceptual invariances.30 Unless our sensory-perceptual appa-
ratus had finely tuned mechanisms for preserving ratio informa-
tion, speech could only be understood at one level of volume and 
a picture or a face would only be recognizable at one level of 
illumination. If you are wondering what all this sensory-per-
ceptual business has to do with probability and juridical infer-
ences, perhaps you have forgotten Hume's argument (cited 
above) in which he says that all probable reasoning is a species 
of sensation. I, for one, have taken this analogy very seriously 
in efforts to understand complex inference. 36 
In both the PM and Pi systems probability is viewed as a 
quantitative rather than a qualitative property. One difference 
between the two systems is that PI assumes ordinal judgments 
only whereas subjective interpretations of PM allow for ratio 
33. See, e.g., Slovic & Lichtenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression 
Approaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment, 6 ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 649 (1971). 
34. L. MARKS, SENSORY PROCESSES (1974). 
35. S. STEVENS, PSYCHOPHYSICS (1975). 
36. Schum, supra, note 23. 
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judgments of the sort we have discussed. Under this subjectivist 
view, when a person tells you H is ten times more probable than 
HC, given evidence E, this person probably means what he says 
and is likely to give the same response again under similar cir-
cumstances. It is interesting to note that research indicates that 
individuals' estimates come closer to PM calculations when they 
respond in odds rather than in probabilities.37 To reject human 
ability to form ratios is to reject the results of countless experi-
ments in which such judgments were made naturally and con-
sistently. 
Following are specific comments I have about the paradoxes 
the author claims to exist when PM is applied to juridical in-
ference. 
a. Conjunction rule difficulties in civil suits. Since the law 
requires plaintiff to prove each element or point Hi on the bal-
ance of probabilities, we must have PM (Hi IE) > PM (Hic IE) 
if Hi- is independent of other elements; this requires PM (Hi IE) 
> 0.5 as we have seen. If the elements are not independent we 
may have, for example, the requirement that PM (H2 IH1 n 
E) > PM (H2cl H1 n E); this means that PM (H2 IHl n E) 
> 0.5. lfthe proving of each point constitutes a separate infer-
ence-problem, then there is no difficulty for PM . If, in addition, 
as the author argues, plaintiff must prove his overall contention 
H = (H1 n H2 r'l ... n Hn) on the balance of probabilities, 
then there:-are difficulties for PM. In this case we must have 
PM (H1 U H2 U ... U Hn) > PM (H1C nH2C n. nHnC). 
It is a relatively easy matter to establish that, under this addi-
tional requirement~ the ·product PM (H1-rE) · .PM (H2 IH1 n 
E).• .... •PM (Hn IHn-·1 -,t Hn_·. 2 n ... n H2 n H1 n E) 
must be greater than 0.5. If you agree with the author that both 
requirements must be met, then PM produces the paradoxical 
results the author claims. Some may wish to argue, however, 
that the additional requirement of proof of the overall conten-
tion constitutes inferential double jeopardy. Having won each 
individual contest to the satisfaction of the law, why should the 
defendant now be required to show that he won all of them? 
Cohen says this is closing one's eyes to facts one does not like. 
b. Inference upon inference. Suppose you must prove E 
from F and then prove H from E. In civil cases the author tells 
37. Phillips & Edwards, Conservatism in a Simple Probability Inference 
Task, 72 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 346, 352-54 (1966). 
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us that a frequent constraint is that, though H may be proved 
from E on balance of probabilities, E must be proved from F 
beyond reasonable doubt. The author, speaking normatively, 
says this corresponds with expectation since proof should de-
pend upon what is probably inferable from known facts rather 
than what is certainly inferable from probable facts. These· are 
extremes, of course; what about the commonly occurring in-
stance in which proof must depend upon what is probably in-
ferable from probable facts? This seems to characterize many 
situations in civil and criminal trials in which inference rests 
upon catenations of circumstantial events and in which informa-
tion about these events comes from witnesses who are not in-
fallible observers and who are subject to all manner of biasing 
and other motivational influences. 
Consider a simple inference upon inference involving testi-
monial evidence where the occurrence of E is to be proved from 
testimony E! from witness Wi and His to be proved from E. 
Under the above-mentioned constraint, though H be provable 
from Eon balance of probability, E must be proved from Ei 
beyond reasonable doubt. Perhaps in those instances in which 
this constraint is not enforced the court has recognized some-
thing which well-posed PM formalizations make clear: an al-
ready weak linkage between--E and H cannot be much disturbed 
by a less than perfect linkage between E i . and E nor can a 
strong lin~age between E and H be preserved by a weak linkage 
between Ei and E. The observed transitivity of the PM formu-
lations simply asserts that in establishing the probative value of 
testimony there can be trade-offs between the probative value 
of the event being reported and the credibility of the source re-
porting the occurrence of this event. 
c. Negation. Imagine a civil suit tried according to PM in 
which plaintiff proves all points on the balance of probability 
and proves the overall contention H on balance of probability. 
Suppose PM (HIE} = 0.501; then, as PM requires, PM (HCjE} 
= 0.499. As the author argues, defendant can feel cheated be-
cause the court apparently recognizes that there is a substantial 
probability of his contention HC on the evidence presented. Now 
let us try another case, this time according to P1 , in which plain-
tiff loses one point Hi on balance of probabilities. When plaintiff 
asks what the value of PJ (Hi, E} is, he cannot believe his ears 
when told that it is zero. Surely, he says, there has been suppres-
sion of uncertainty somewhere in the process. We argue that he 
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does not understand inductive probability. Apart from the fact 
that no conception of probability is likely to make a loser any 
happier, the negation principle for P1 operates with a harshness 
and discontinuity which many persons will not find characteris-
tic of their own inductive reasoning processes. However, the 
author tells us that his claim is the modest one that some people 
use the P1 concept, particularly in law courts.38 
d. Beyond a reasonable doubt. I freely admit to some dis-
comfort about the nonspecific nature of this forensic standard of 
proof when matters are construed in terms of the PM system. 
The author's Pi system is much more specific regarding this 
standard of proof but I believe there is still reason for discom-
fort. Within Pi, proof beyond a reasonable doubt means proof at 
a level of inductive certainty; i.e., when there is no specific 
reason for doubting the truth of a conclusion. Maximum Pi (H, 
E) is obtained when evidence E includes all relevant points to be 
established together with satisfaction that the prosecution has 
proven these points. I, for one, have difficulty imagining a situ-
ation in which all relevant points have been listed, let alone 
established in fact. 
Consideration of witness credibility is of obvious importance 
here but I find the author to be rather vague about the formal 
connection between the credibility of a witness and the proba-
tive value of the testimony given by the witness. He regards the 
probability that the witness is telling the truth as an inductive 
probability whose value depends upon the grade of inductive 
support for the prediction that the· witness will give credible 
testimony, given what you know about the witness. I could not 
discover how credibility-related information is combined, if at 
all, with information about the probative value of the event the 
witness reports in order to establish the probative value of the 
testimony. In part, this is due to the fact that the author does 
not distinguish between the occurrence of event E and the testi-
mony E.i of this event given by a witness. 
I have already spoken my piece on the "criterion" difficulties 
mentioned by the author. The next difficulty on his list concerns 
corroborative and converging evidence. The author's main point 
here concerned his arguments against prior-posterior analyses 
in establishing the weight of evidence. I have also discussed this 
38. L. J. COHEN, supra note 8, at 118. 
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matter above and have shown how such a prior-posterior analy-
sis is consistent with rule 401 on relevancy. 
IV. IN CONCLUSION 
I have told you that I am a defendant in the case Cohen pre-
sents against the interpretation of legal standards of proof and 
of other evidentiary issues in terms of Pascalian or mathemati-
cal probability. A defendant's praise for the work of a prosecut-
ing attorney is perhaps rare enough to be noteworthy and I do 
indeed offer my praise for Cohen's w-otk. At least the length of 
this review should suggest how seriously I took his arguments. 
The system of inductive probability he offers does explain 
certain paradoxes with which one is confronted when one tries 
to apply mathematical probabilities to juridical inference. The 
mathematical probability system is now very rich and some 
very difficult inferential problems can find formal representa-
tion within this system. However, the author believes that the 
price to be paid for this richnes~ is too high. After you read his 
work you may or may not agree about the extravagance of the 
price. However, this book is guaranteed to deflate the hardened 
mathematicist who may perceive that mathematical probability 
is the only system within which canons for coherent probabilis-
tic inference can be found. 
Not all of this book can be read easily without some back-
ground in formal logic. However, the parts of the book that con-
cern juridical inference can, I believe, be read quite easily with-
out this background. This book ought to be read by other per-
sons whose research interests relate to juridical inference. The 
author discusses how his system of inductive probabilities seems 
to account for some of the results found by experimental psy-
chologists when they study human behavior in probabilistic in-
ference tasks. In summary, I found The Probable and the Prov-
able a profound and stimulating work of scholarship, and I 
close my comments with applause for its author. 
